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I. INTRODUCTION
Society has developed several uses for the psychological phenome-
non known as hypnosis.' These uses, mostly medical in nature, include
substituting for anesthesia and treating pain, anxiety, phobias, and al-
lergies.2 Not surprisingly, some professional athletes have turned to
hypnosis for better success on the playing field.3 While the scientific
and medical communities generally have accepted these uses,4 contro-
versy has arisen over the use of hypnosis in legal proceedings to refresh
the memory of a witness who testifies later in court.5
The use of hypnosis for investigating crimes 6 began in the early
1970s when law enforcement agencies and police departments formed
the first "Svengali Squads" comprised of specially trained units for
hypno-investigative purposes. Despite the early success' of this special
1. As one court has observed, "[tihe exact nature of the hypnotic state is not understood."
United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1201 (5th Cir. 1984); accord Sprynczynatyk v. General
Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.5 (8th Cir. 1985) (observing that "there is no single generally
accepted theory of hypnosis, nor a consensus about a single definition"). Black's Law Dictionary
defines "hypnotism" as "[tihe act of inducing artificially a state of sleep or trance in a subject by
means of verbal suggestion by the hypnotist or by the subject's concentration upon some object. It
is generally characterized by extreme responsiveness to suggestions from the hypnotist." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 668 (5th rev. ed. 1979). Franz Mesmer (1734-1815), an Austrian physician, is gen-
erally credited with the "discovery" of hypnosis in the late eighteenth century. See 9 ENCYCLOPE-
DIA BRITTANICA 134 (15th ed. 1976).
2. Gelman, Illusions That Heal, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 17, 1986, at 74-75.
3. Thomas, Thinking Positive: Hypnotist Peter Siegel Believes He Has Answer for Under-
achieving Athletes, L.A. Times, July 26, 1986, § 3, at 8, col. 1.
4. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 206 (3d ed. 1984).
5. Dr. Martin T. Orne, an expert on hypnosis, has stated, "The medical uses of hypnosis are
not controversial; what is controversial is the use of hypnosis in questioning suspects and witnesses
to solve crimes." Hypnosis "Useful in Medicine, Dangerous in Court," U.S. NEWS & WORLD RE-
PORT, Dec. 12, 1983, at 67 [hereinafter Hypnosis].
6. Because most cases concerned with the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony
are criminal cases and because "courts generally apply their same reasoning for post-hypnotic tes-
timony in civil cases to criminal trials," McQueen v. Garrison, 619 F. Supp. 116, 128 (E.D.N.C.
1985), rev'd on other grounds, 814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1987), this Recent Development will focus on
the criminal setting.
7. Serrill, Breaking the Spell of Hypnosis, TIME, Sept. 17, 1984, at 62. In 1970 the Los Ange-
les Police Department became the first to employ a hypnosis team. This team handled approxi-
mately 70 cases in its first five years of existence. The Svengali Squad, TIME, Sept. 13, 1976, at 56.
The squads are named after the hypnotist in the novel Trilby who overpowers a helpless woman
and thereafter inspires her to musical achievement. See G. DU MAURIER, TRILBY (1894).
8. Hypnosis provided a breakthrough in the famous 1975 kidnapping of a bus load of chil-
dren outside of Chowchilla, California. The bus driver's ability, while under hypnosis, to identify
most of the kidnappers' license plate led to the arrest and conviction of three men for the crime.
See State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 686, 643 P.2d 246, 250 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981).
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investigative technique and its increased use in recent years, state and
federal courts are increasingly excluding the hypnotically refreshed tes-
timony of witnesses other than criminal defendants who take the
stand.9 Rather than following the per se admissible approach, once es-
poused by the Maryland Supreme Court in Harding v. State,10 or the
procedural safeguards approach, first articulated by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court in State v. Hurd," state courts are beginning to adopt a
rule of per se inadmissibility. Federal courts as well are slowly leaning
towards outright inadmissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony.
The leaders of this general shift are the Minnesota and California su-
preme courts, in State v. Mack 2 and People v. Shirley13 respectively,
together with the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Valdez.' 4 Significant
indicators of this trend are the exchange by two state supreme courts of
9. In Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987), the United States Supreme Court, by a five
to four vote, vacated a decision by the Arkansas Supreme Court holding that Rock, who was
charged with manslaughter in the death of her husband, could not testify about events discussed
during a hypnotic session conducted prior to trial to refresh Rock's memory. The Court addressed
"whether Arkansas' evidentiary rule prohibiting the admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony
violated petitioner's constitutional right to testify on her own behalf as a defendant in a criminal
case." Id. at 2706. The Court emphasized "the premise that the right to testify on one's own behalf
in defense to a criminal charge is a fundamental constitutional right." Id. at 2710 n.10. Therefore,
while conceding that hypnosis may introduce an element of "unreliability," id. at 2713, the Court
held that Arkansas failed to show "that hypnotically enhanced testimony is always so untrustwor-
thy and so immune to the traditional means of evaluating credibility that it should disable a de-
fendant from presenting her version of the events for which she is on trial." Id. at 2714.
Consequently, the Court ruled that "Arkansas' per se rule excluding all posthypnosis testimony
infringes impermissibly on the right of a defendant to testify on his or her own behalf." Id. at
2714-15.
Historically, far more prosecution witnesses than criminal defendants have undergone pretrial
hypnosis. Stewart, Hypnotized Witnesses, Loaded Jurors, 73 A.BA J., Oct. 1, 1987, at 56. In light
of this fact, together with the expressly narrow scope of the Rock decision--"[tlhis case does not
involve the admissibility of testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses other than criminal de-
fendants and we express no opinion on that issue," id. at 2712 n.15-the trend as espoused in this
Recent Development remains intact if only slightly modified. In fact, at least one state court since
Rock noted the Supreme Court's decision, but chose not to extend it beyond its narrow circum-
stances, instead following "the clear majority of other jurisdictions in this country," which does not
permit in-court use of hypnotically enhanced evidence because of its inherent unreliability. People
v. Zayas, 159 Ill. App. 3d 554, 510 N.E.2d 1125, 1134 (1987). But cf. People v. Romero, 745 P.2d
1003 (Colo. 1987) (en banc) (adopting stance admitting such testimony where the hypnotic session
complies with certain procedural safeguards).
In light of the Rock decision, all general references in this Recent Development to testimony
that has been refreshed or enhanced through hypnotic means should be interpreted as referring
only to testimony by non-criminal defendants.
10. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
11. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
12. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
13. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860
(1982).
14. 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984).
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their past rules of per se admissibility for per se inadmissible stances.15
The overall trend is unmistakable. As more courts grapple with whether
to admit hypnotically enhanced testimony, the body of decisions re-
flects a growing consensus that the potential value of this testimony is
outweighed by the risks inherent in its admission.
This Recent Development considers whether the trend toward in-
admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony is a welcome develop-
ment.16 Part II reviews the major state and federal cases that have laid
the foundation for the current debate. Part III analyzes several recent
opinions that reflect a sustained shift away from liberal admission to-
ward per se inadmissibility. Part IV argues that this shift is a positive
development for the American legal system. Finally, Part V outlines a
proper analytical framework for state and federal courts to follow in
deciding this important evidentiary issue.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Tripartite Regime of State Courts
In 1897 the California Supreme Court, in People v. Ebanks,17 de-
clared that the "law of the United States does not recognize hypno-
tism."' 8 Since then, however, some courts considering the admissibility
of hypnotically induced testimony 9 have been more receptive to hypno-
sis.O° State courts generally have split into three groups on whether to
admit hypnotically induced testimony. In contrast to Ebanks, the first
15. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals decision in Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 447
A.2d 1272 (1982), overruled its earlier decision in Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302
(1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969); similarly, the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v.
Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 319 S.E.2d 177 (1984), overruled its earlier decision in State v. McQueen,
295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978).
16. This topic should be contrasted with the issue of whether statements made under hypno-
sis can themselves be introduced as evidence at trial. That question has been conclusively settled:
"It appears to be the rule in all jurisdictions in which the matter has been considered that state-
ments made under hypnosis may not be introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted
because the reliability of such statements is questionable." People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 665, 602
P.2d 738, 753-54, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818, 833-34 (1979).
17. 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897).
18. Id. at 665, 49 P. at 1053. The court refused to admit a hypnotist's testimony concerning
an exculpatory statement made by the defendant while under hypnosis.
19. The number of decisions involving this issue has increased dramatically in the last few
decades. Until 1968 only eight cases adjudicated the issue; from 1975 to 1980, 22 cases ruled on it.
Note, The Admissibility of Testimony Influenced by Hypnosis, 67 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1203 n.4
(1981).
20. Receptive courts, see infra notes 24-45, reflected an acceptance of hypnosis within the
medical and psychological communities. In fact, the British and American Medical Associations
issued statements in the mid-1950s formally approving the study and therapeutic use of hypnosis,
while in 1960 the American Psychological Association recognized hypnosis as a branch of psychol-
ogy. See E. HILGARD, HYPNOTIC SUSCEPTIBILITY 3-5 (1965).
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approach holds that the testimony of a witness whose memory has been
hypnotically refreshed before trial is per se admissible, with the fact of
hypnosis affecting only the witness' credibility. 21 Under the second ap-
proach, courts rule on admissibility of testimony based on whether cer-
tain procedural safeguards were followed during hypnosis.22 Finally, the
third approach adopts a per se inadmissibility rule because of the lack
of general scientific acceptance of hypnosis to refresh memories for liti-
23gation purposes.
1. The Harding Approach: Impact Only on Credibility
The 1968 case of Harding v. State24 was the first reported decision
to consider the use of hypnosis to enhance a witness' memory for trial.25
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals permitted a rape victim to tes-
tify as to the identity of her attacker based on her hypnotically re-
freshed memory. Finding in favor of admissibility, the court held that
the use of hypnosis affected only on the credibility of the testimony;26
thus, the trier of fact may decide how much weight to give a witness'
recollection revived through hypnosis.
Other courts quickly followed the Harding rationale. In State v.
Jorgensen28 an Oregon appeals court specifically relied on Harding to
admit the hypnotically enhanced testimony of two prosecution wit-
nesses in a murder trial. Emphasizing the in-court disclosure of hypno-
sis as used prior to trial and the opportunity for rigorous cross-
examination by the defendant's counsel, the court held that objections
to the testimony "go to its weight rather than its admissibility" and
that assessing the witnesses' credibility was a decision for the jury.29
Several subsequent state rulings on whether to admit hypnotically
refreshed testimony have made Harding the majority rule among state
courts.30 In effect, the Harding rule treats the use of hypnosis to refresh
21. See infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 46-72 and accompanying text.
24. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
25. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness,
68 CALIF. L. REv. 313, 322 (1980).
26. 5 Md. App. at 235-36, 246 A.2d at 306.
27. Id.
28. 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971).
29. Id. at 9, 492 P.2d at 315. Oregon has codified the admissibility of hypnotically-induced
testimony; the statute requires that "the entire [hypnotic] procedure be recorded either on video-
tape or any mechanical recording device," and that the videotape or recording be made available to
the opposing party. See O. REv. STAT. § 136.675 (1984).
30. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Creamer v. State, 232
Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979);
State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756 (La. 1983); State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); State
1988]
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a witness' memory much like other memory refreshing devices. There-
fore, the resulting testimony presents a type of present recollection re-
freshed." Central to the underlying rationale supporting the Harding
rule is the confidence, expressed in Jorgensen and elsewhere,32 that ad-
ept cross-examination of the hypnotically refreshed witness will suffi-
ciently test the credibility of the testimony. Courts following Harding
hold that the use of hypnosis does not bar the admission of the result-
ing testimony and that hypnosis is merely one relevant factor that the
factfinder may take into account in weighing a witness' credibility.
2. The Hurd Approach: Procedural Safeguards
Several courts after Harding expressed skepticism over a jury's
ability to assess the credibility of hypnotically induced testimony.33
These courts decided that the trial judge must make an initial determi-
nation of admissibility based on whether the use of hypnosis complied
with certain procedural safeguards. This determination is thought to be
a sufficient guarantee of reliability and trustworthiness in the witness'
testimony.
State v. Hurd3 4 was the first state ruling to impose a specific list of
safeguards on hypnotically refreshed testimony. In Hurd a stabbing vic-
tim was unable to identify her assailant until she was placed under hyp-
nosis, during which she identified her ex-husband as the attacker.35 The
New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the standard for the admissibility
of scientific evidence established in Frye v. United States3 6 The Frye
test conditions the admissibility of evidence resulting from a new scien-
tific method on the general acceptance of that method "in the particu-
lar field in which it belongs. '3 7 Finding that the policy reasons
underlying the "general acceptance" standard apply to hypnotically re-
freshed testimony,38 Hurd followed Frye and held that, when properly
used, hypnosis is a reasonably reliable method of restoring a person's
memory.39
v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983); State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981);
Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982).
31. See Note, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony, 20 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 223, 230 (1984). See generally FED. R. EVID. 612.
32. See, e.g., State v. Wren, 425 So. 2d 756, 759 (La. 1983).
33. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 44.
34. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
35. Id. at 530-31, 432 A.2d at 88-89.
36. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
37. Id. at 1014.
38. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 536, 432 A.2d at 91.
39. Id. at 538, 432 A.2d at 92. The court continued: "[Hlypnotically-induced testimony may
be admissible if the proponent of the testimony can demonstrate that the use of hypnosis in the
particular case was a reasonably reliable means of restoring memory comparable to normal recall
[Vol. 41:379
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After reviewing scientific literature supporting hypnosis, 0 the
Hurd court set forth specific procedural safeguards to ensure that hyp-
nosis would be administered properly in appropriate cases.41 The court
imposed six procedural requirements with which a party must comply
before introducing hypnotically refreshed testimony. These require-
ments include using an independent hypnotist and recording all con-
tacts between the hypnotist and the subject.42 Because the prosecution
failed to satisfy all of these procedural requirements, the Hurd court
excluded the proposed in-court identification of the defendant.43
Since Hurd, several other state courts have adopted the procedural
safeguards approach.4 4 Oregon has even codified it.45 This position rep-
in its accuracy." Id.
Ironically, the Frye test has been adopted by most courts that follow a per se inadmissibility
approach. See infra notes 46-72 and accompanying text. The Hurd court viewed such use of Frye
as improper: contrary to those courts' position, the court argued, hypnosis need not "be generally
accepted as a means of reviving truthful or historically accurate recall. . . .The purpose of hypno-
sis is not to obtain truth. . . .Instead, hypnosis is employed as a means of overcoming amnesia
and restoring the memory of a witness." Hurd, 86 N.J. at 537, 432 A.2d at 92. Later, the court
directly opposed the per se inadmissibility approach, claiming that it "is unnecessarily broad and
will result in the exclusion of evidence that is as trustworthy, as other eyewitness testimony," which
the court saw as itself possessing "similar shortcomings" as hypnotically enhanced testimony. Id.
at 541, 432 A.2d at 94.
40. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 538-42, 432 A.2d at 92-95.
41. Id. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97. In addition to the procedural requirements, the court
reviewed two merely illustrative factors: (1) "the manner of questioning and the presence of cues
or suggestions during the trance and the post-hypnotic period," and (2) "the amenability of the
subject to hypnosis." Id. at 544-45, 432 A.2d at 96.
42. The court described the guidelines as follows:
First, a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in the use of hypnosis must conduct the
session....
Second, the professional conducting the hypnotic session should be independent of and
not regularly employed by the prosecutor, investigator or defense. . ..
Third, any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement personnel or the de-
fense prior to the hypnotic session must be recorded, either in writing or another suitable
form ...
Fourth, before inducing hypnosis the hypnotist should obtain from the subject a detailed
description of the facts as the subject remembers them ...
Fifth, all contacts between the hypnotist and the subject must be recorded..
Sixth, only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during any phase of the hyp-
notic session, including the pre-hypnotic testing and the post-hypnotic interview.
Id. at 545-46, 432 A.2d at 96-97 (emphasis in original). These guidelines were first suggested by Dr.
Martin T. Orne, a leading expert on hypnosis, in an affidavit of amicus curiae filed with the United
States Supreme Court in Quaglino v. California, No. 29766 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 875 (1978).
43. Hurd, 86 N.J. at 548-49, 432 A.2d at 98.
44. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Iwakiri, 106
Idaho 618, 682 P.2d 571 (1984); House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815 (Miss. 1984); State v. Beachum, 97
N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Weston, 16 Ohio App. 3d 279, 475 N.E.2d
805 (1984); State v. Long, 32 Wash. App. 732, 649 P.2d 845 (1982); State v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d
555, 329 N.W.2d 386, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 946 (1983).
45. See supra note 29.
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resents the middle ground between two opposite per se approaches.
Rather than follow a strict rule of admissibility or inadmissibility, these
courts assess hypnotically enhanced testimony on a case-by-case basis.
The critical factor of admissibility for a court adopting the Hurd view is
the reliability of the testimony as determined by the procedures used to
administer the hypnosis.
3. The Strict Frye Approach: General Acceptance by Scientific
Community
In contrast to the Hurd approach, some courts have held that the
use of hypnosis to refresh a witness' memory irrevocably taints the re-
sulting testimony so that no combination of procedures can save it.
Like the Hurd court, these courts have used the general acceptance test
enunciated in Frye46 as a vehicle for their approach. Unlike Hurd, how-
ever, these courts arrive at a different result after applying the Frye
test and, thus, preclude admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony
in every case.47
The 1980 case of State v. Mack4 was the first major ruling to em-
ploy Frye in excluding hypnotically refreshed testimony. Faced with a
rape victim whose ability to recount the assault was induced almost en-
tirely by hypnosis, the Minnesota Supreme Court turned first to the
Frye rule. Under Frye the results of a scientific test are not admissible
unless experts in the field generally accept the results as scientifically
reliable and accurate. 49 A review of expert testimony"° informed the
Mack court that "hypnosis can create a memory of perceptions which
neither were nor could have been made."'51 Thus, the lack of confidence
by the scientific community in hypnotically refreshed testimony led the
court to hold that a witness may not testify in a criminal proceeding to
matters that the witness remembered under hypnosis.52
46. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
47. One of these courts claimed that the court in Hurd adopted the Frye standard but then
"immediately qualified the rule to require only that in any case the hypnosis produce a recall that
is, in effect, no more inaccurate than that of the average witness who has not been hypnotized."
People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 37-38, 641 P.2d 775, 786, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 254 (en banc), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982). See generally supra note 39.
48. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
49. Id. at 768.
50. Id. at 768-69.
51. Id. at 769.
52. Id. at 771. The court, however, recognized the use of hypnosis as "an extremely useful
investigative tool" to provide new leads to a crime. Id. According to the court, hypnosis for this
purpose should be accompanied by Hurd-like safeguards "to assure the utmost freedom from sug-
gestion upon the hypnotized person's memory recall in the event he or she must later be called to
testify to recollections recorded before the hypnotic interview." Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 41:379
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The California Supreme Court in People v. Shirley53 firmly estab-
lished the per se inadmissibility approach. Like Mack, Shirley involved
the hypnosis of a rape victim to refresh her memory of the assault.5 4
Unlike Mack, however, the witness in Shirley gained no apparent credi-
bility from the hypnosis.5 5 The court, in a lengthy opinion, rejected the
Harding56 and Hurd57 alternatives, choosing instead Frye's per se inad-
missible approach. 8 The court analyzed relevant scientific literature on
the forensic use of hypnosis.5 9 This analysis,6° necessary to the Frye
test, revealed that many scholars in the scientific community oppose
the use of hypnosis to restore the memory of a witness because of the
intrinsic unreliability of hypnosis, with or without procedural safe-
guards. 1 Accordingly, the court concluded that the Frye test of admis-
sibility had not been satisfied because the scientific community
generally did not accept the use of hypnosis to restore the memory of a
witness as reliable.2 The court held that the testimony of a witness
whose memory has been refreshed by hypnosis is inadmissible on all
matters relating to the events in issue, from the time of the hypnotic
session forward. 3
53. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860
(1982).
54. Id. at 23-30, 641 P.2d at 777-81, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 245-49.
55. As stated by the Shirley court, "the record is replete with instances in which her testi-
mony was vague, changeable, self-contradictory, or prone to unexplained lapses of memory." Id. at
23, 641 P.2d at 777, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
56. Id. at 35-36, 641 P.2d at 784-85, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 252-53.
57. Id. at 37-40, 641 P.2d at 786-87, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 254-55. The court accepted the criti-
cism of the Harding approach by the Hurd followers, see supra note 56, but then exposed the
weaknesses of the latter approach:
To begin with, we are not persuaded that the requirements adopted in Hurd and other
cases will in fact forestall each of the dangers at which they are directed. Next, we observe
that certain dangers of hypnosis are not even addressed by the Hurd requirements....
Lastly, even if requirements could be devised that were adequate in theory, we have
grave doubts that they could be administered in practice without injecting undue delay and
confusion into the judicial process.
Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d at 39, 641 P.2d at 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
58. Id. at 40, 641 P.2d at 787, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
59. Id. at 57-66, 641 P.2d at 798-804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 266-72.
60. Analysis of scientific literature is critical to applying the Frye test. In deciding whether a
certain method meets the Frye test of general scientific acceptance, "scientists have long been
permitted to speak to the courts through their published writings in scholarly treatises and jour-
nals." Id. at 56, 641 P.2d at 797, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 265. In this case, the court held that "if a fair
overview of the literature discloses that scientists significant either in number or expertise publicly
oppose that use of hypnosis as unreliable, the court may safely conclude there is no such consensus
at the present time." Id. at 56, 641 P.2d at 797, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
61. Id. at 56, 641 P.2d at 798, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
62. Id. at 66, 641 P.2d at 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 272-73.
63. Id. at 66-67, 641 P.2d at 804, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
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This ruling extended the holding in Mack64 to disallow any testi-
mony in court about topics covered during hypnosis. In so doing, Shir-
ley opened the way for the exclusion of testimony about events that a
witness remembered and reported in an interview before the hypnosis."
The court, however, did recognize four "limitations" on its ruling, in-
cluding the right of a defendant to testify despite pretrial hypnosis
66
and the propriety of employing hypnosis for investigative purposes.
Finding that none of these exceptions brought the case outside the rule
excluding hypnotically refreshed testimony, the court found that the
trial court's admission of the victim's testimony constituted prejudicial
error and reversed the conviction. 8
The Mack and Shirley courts, though in disagreement on the exact
parameters of exclusion under Frye, created a powerful rule of inadmis-
sibility. Many other state courts have embraced this position since
1980,69 including the very court that decided Harding.7 In 1982 a
Maryland appeals court in Collins v. State7 1 overruled Harding and
adopted a per se inadmissibility approach.72 These courts have con-
64. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
65. In this vein, one justice concurring in the result noted that "the expansive exclusionary
rule fashioned by the majority in this case is considerably broader than the rule adopted by the
out-of-state decisions on which the majority purports to rely." Id. at 77 n.3, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 279
n.3 (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting).
66. Id. at 67, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273. The court accepted this limitation to avoid "impairing
the fundamental right of an accused to testify in his own behalf." Id. See generally supra note 9
and accompanying text.
67. Id. at 67, 641 P.2d at 805, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 273. The court warned, however, that in light
of its ruling "any person who has been hypnotized for investigative purposes will not be allowed to
testify as a witness to the events that were the subject of the hypnotic session." Id. at 68, 641 P.2d
at 805, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
68. Id. at 70, 641 P.2d at 806, 181 Cal Rptr. at 275.
69. See, e.g., State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266 (1982);
State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); People v. Quintanar, 659 P.2d 710 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1982); State v. Atwood, 39 Conn. Supp. 273, 479 A.2d 258 (1984); State v. Davis, 490 A.2d 601
(Del. Super. Ct. 1985); Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 295 (1986);
State v. Moreno, 709 P.2d 103 (Haw. 1985); Peterson v. State, 448 N.E.2d 673 (Ind. 1983); State v.
Haislip, 237 Kan. 461, 701 P.2d 909, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 575 (1985); State v. Collins, 296 Md.
670, 464 A.2d 1028 (1983); Commonwealth v. Kater, 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190 (1983); People
v. Gonzales, 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (1982); Alsbach v. Bader, 700 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. 1985)
(en banc); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523,
453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983); Robison v. State, 677 P.2d 1080 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1246 (1984); Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981);
State v. Martin, 101 Wash. 2d 713, 684 P.2d 651 (1984).
70. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969).
71. 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982).
72. The adoption by the Maryland Court of Appeals of the Frye test in Reed v. State, 283
Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978), formed the basis of this court's reversal: "applying the standards
explicated in Frye for the use of hypnosis to restore or refresh the memory of a witness is not
accepted as reliable by the relevant scientific community and such testimony is therefore inadmis-
sible." Collins, 52 Md. App. at 205, 447 A.2d at 1283.
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cluded that under the Frye test, hypnotically enhanced testimony is so
tainted by unreliability that it must be automatically excluded.
B. The More Uniform Stance of the Federal Courts
The federal courts have exhibited more unity than the state courts
in deciding whether to admit hypnotically refreshed testimony. Like
many early state court decisions,7 3 federal rulings in the early 1970s
demonstrated a policy of liberal admissibility. The issues involved in
using hypnosis to refresh a witness' memory related merely to the
weight of the evidence.74 Again, as many state courts did,75 the federal
courts by the late 1970s and early 1980s demonstrated greater caution
in admitting hypnotically induced testimony when safeguards were not
employed during the hypnotic session.7 8
1. Early Decisions
In assessing the treatment of this issue by the federal courts, the
extensive familiarity of the Ninth Circuit 7 with the issue of hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony lends particular significance to that circuit's
decisions. In the Ninth Circuit's first case on the issue, Wyller v.
Fairchild Hiller Corp.,75 the court established the position that was
dominant in the federal courts for many years. The plaintiff, who was
the sole survivor of a helicopter crash, underwent hypnosis four years
after the crash in order to better recall the events surrounding the inci-
dent.79 Rejecting the defendant's argument that testimony resulting
from the hypnosis was inherently unreliable, the court treated the case
as one of present recollection refreshed in which the jury must assess
the witness' credibility and determine the weight to give his testi-
mony. 0 The court emphasized the defendant's ability to challenge the
reliability of the plaintiff's testimony by extensive cross-examination of
both the plaintiff and his hypnotist.8 "
73. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
77. One commentator notes that the "Ninth Circuit has had more experience with the issue
of hypnotically refreshed testimony than any other reviewing court." Perry, The Trend Toward
Exclusion of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony-Has the Right Question Been Asked?, 31 U.
KAN. L. REv. 579, 587 (1983).
78. 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974).
79. Id. at 509.
80. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit generally is credited with
being the first federal court to admit hypnotically enhanced testimony in a civil case, though with
little discussion of the issue. See Connolly v. Farmer, 484 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1973).
81. 503 F.2d at 509-10.
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The following year the Ninth Circuit confirmed this approach in
Kline v. Ford Motor Co.8 2 In this strict liability action against the auto-
mobile manufacturer after an accident, the injured witness used hypno-
sis to overcome her retrograde amnesia so that she could testify.
8 3
Relying on Wyller, the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court's exclusion
of the plaintiff's testimony and held that the hypnosis used to refresh
her memory went to the credibility of her testimony and not to her
competence as a witness. 8 4 According to the court, the witness was fully
capable of expressing herself and understanding her duty to tell the
truth. 5
These rulings provided the basis for numerous decisions handed
down by other federal courts.8 Wyller and Kline fit squarely within the
Harding rule of per se admissibility based on the concept of present
recollection refreshed.8 7 Implicit in this approach is the perceived suffi-
cient guarantee of the testimony's reliability because of the opportu-
nity, at least in theory, for thorough cross-examination.
2. Later Decisions
The Ninth Circuit later began to appreciate the potential risks in-
herent in admitting hypnotically enhanced testimony. In the court's
first criminal case involving hypnosis, United States v. Adams,s8 the
court qualified its approval of hypnosis as a technique to refresh a wit-
ness' memory. In affirming the trial court's admission of testimony
given by an eyewitness hypnotized to improve recall of a murder and
robbery,8 the court expressed its concern that hypnotizing potential
witnesses for investigatory purposes could be abused. 0 The court urged
the exercise of great care to insure that statements after hypnosis are
the subject's own recollections instead of memories tainted by hypnotic
suggestions." While stating disapproval with the hypnotic procedures
82. 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975).
83. Id. at 1069.
84. Id. at 1069-70. The court explained that "[a]lthough the device by which recollection was
refreshed is unusual, in legal effect her situation is not different from that of a witness who claims
that his recollection of an event that he could not earlier remember was revived when he thereafter
read a particular document." Id.
85. Id. at 1069.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Waksal, 539 F. Supp. 834 (S.D. Fla. 1982), rev'd on other
grounds, 709 F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich.
1977).
87. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
88. 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978).
89. Id. at 198.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 198-99. In a footnote, the court suggested that "at a minimum, complete steno-
graphic records of interviews of hypnotized persons who later testify should be maintained. An
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followed in the case at hand, 2 the court nevertheless relied on the hold-
ing of Kline to reject the defendant's challenge to the testimony.9 3 The
Ninth Circuit confirmed this approach in a later case, 94 which together
with Adams establishes a powerful precedent for other federal courts to
following in adopting Hurd's procedural safeguards approach over the
Harding approach.9 5
In a landmark ruling against the per se admissibility rule enunci-
ated in Harding, the Fifth Circuit in Unites States v. Valdez96 focused
on a single type of post-hypnotic testimony: identification by the wit-
ness of a known suspect whom the witness had been unable to identify
before being hypnotized.9 7 After reviewing the relevant scientific litera-
ture on hypnosis98 and the Supreme Court's decision in Manson v.
Brathwaite,99 the Fifth Circuit excluded any uncorroborated identifica-
tion of a suspect made after the witness underwent hypnosis.100 The
court adopted a rule of per se inadmissibility for these post-hypnotic
identifications, regardless of the procedures used. 01 The court also
stated that, depending on the circumstances, the use of procedural safe-
guards might favor admissibility of corroborated post-hypnotic testi-
mony.102 The court espoused a Hurd-like procedural safeguards
approach, even though the testimony on corroborated, post-hypnotic
identification of a person singled out for suspicion, was held to be inad-
audio or video recording of the interview would be helpful." Id. at 199 n.12.
92. Id. at 199. The court disapproved because "[a]n uncertified hypnotist conducted the ses-
sion [and because] [n]o record was made of the identity of those present, the questions asked, or
the responses given." Id. at 199 n.13. See generally United States v. Charles, 561 F. Supp. 694, 697
(S.D. Tex. 1983) (stating that "[t]his Court does not believe [the minimum standards for the ad-
mission of hypnotically induced testimony set forth in] the footnote contained in the Adams opin-
ion by the Ninth Circuit to be exhaustive").
93. Adams, 581 F.2d at 199.
94. See United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 & n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
885 (1979).
95. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text; see also Clay v. Vose, 771 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1212 (1986).
96. 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984).
97. Id. at 1202.
98. Id. at 1201-03.
99. 432 U.S. 98 (1977). The Supreme Court found that unduly suggestive identification pro-
cedures in certain circumstances could deny both due process and a fair trial. Id. at 109-14.
100. Valdez, 722 F.2d at 1203.
101. Id. The procedures used in this case were deficient anyway. The court stated, "[Tlhe
procedures employed during the hypnotic session were unduly suggestive," and "[i]n every particu-
lar, they were at variance" with the Hurd procedural safeguards. Id.
102. The court noted: "In a particular case, the evidence favoring admissibility might make
the probative value of the testimony outweigh its prejudicial effect. If adequate procedural safe-
guards have been followed, corroborated post-hypnotic testimony might be admissible." Id. (cita-
tion omitted). In addition, "[i]f a sufficiently reliable method exists for the witness to separate pre-
hypnotic memory from post-hypnotic pseudo-memory," a court may permit the previously hypno-
tized witness to testify about matters recalled and discussed prior to hypnosis. Id. at 1204.
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missible. The Fifth Circuit thus departed, though not expressly, from
the traditional Harding approach of per se admissibility.
0 3
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The state supreme courts of North Carolina, California, and Alaska
recently have considered whether to admit testimony enhanced by the
pretrial use of hypnosis. North Carolina and California reconsidered the
issue in light of previous rulings on the subject. All three concluded, on
the basis of scientific evidence, that hypnotically enhanced testimony is
inadmissible. In so holding, the North Carolina Supreme Court ex-
pressly overruled its prior ruling that the use of hypnosis affected only
the credibility and not the admissibility of the witness' testimony. 0
The California Supreme Court confirmed and clarified the position it
had established earlier in Shirley. °5 Finally, the Alaska Supreme Court
found a number of reasons for adopting a per se inadmissibility ap-
proach.10 6 These rulings demonstrate the unmistakable movement of
state courts towards adoption of the per se inadmissibility approach.
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit followed the Fifth Circuit's Valdez' de-
cision by rejecting the rule of per se admissibility and moving toward
stricter exclusion of hypnotically induced evidence.
103. See also Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487, 492 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3310
(1986); United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1180 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908
(1985). This is, of course, a simplistic interpretation of a very complex opinion. In fact, one could
posit Valdez as a case in limbo, not entirely satisfied with any of the three major approaches
exhibited by state courts. The opinion clearly shows displeasure with a rule of per se admissibility
and implies that compliance with specific procedural safeguards could make certain hypnotically
refreshed testimony admissible. The opinion, however, also accepts the reasoning of the California
Supreme Court in People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (en banc), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982). The court noted, "[I]t is doubtful that safeguards could be adminis-
tered properly and prevented from becoming the major issue at most every trial. Moreover, no
safeguards can prevent all unreliability." Valdez, 722 F.2d at 1202. One must therefore concede
that Valdez's exact position along the spectrum of state court positions is unclear. This explains
one commentator's placement of Valdez in a fourth, separate category based on Rule 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See Note, Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony and the Balancing Pen-
dulum, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 921, 948-51 (1985).
104. See State v. Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 398 S.E.2d 177 (1984); see also infra notes 108-25
and accompanying text.
105. See People v. Guerra, 37 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (en banc), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982); see also infra notes 126-42 and accompanying text.
106. See Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1986); see also infra notes 143-65 and
accompanying text.
107. See Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1263 (1986); see also infra notes 166-77 and accompanying text.
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A. State v. Peoples
In State v. Peoples'"8 the North Carolina Supreme Court reas-
sessed its position of admitting hypnotically refreshed testimony.10 9
Only six years earlier, in State v. McQueen,110 the court had held that
hypnotizing a witness prior to trial bears only on the credibility of that
witness' testimony and does not render the testimony incompetent."'
Peoples involved a prosecution of three men for the armed robbery of a
chemical plant.1 2 One of the participants, upon arrest, agreed to testify
against the defendant and underwent hypnosis to enhance his recall of
the robbery." 3 The court agreed to review the defendant's conviction
by determining whether the post-hypnotic testimony should have been
admitted. The court explained that, at the time of its decision in Mc-
Queen, the court was not fully aware of the problems inherent in
hypnosis." 4
After reviewing the relevant scientific literature," 5 the court em-
phasized two articles written by leading authorities opposed to admit-
ting hypnotically enhanced testimony because of its unreliability."8
The court examined the three approaches adopted by other state
courts 1 7 and reevaluated its prior stance of admitting this testimony
and allowing the jury to assess its credibility. The court found that a
hypnotized person may (1) be extremely susceptible to suggestion; (2)
have an overwhelming desire to please the hypnotist; and (3) be unable
to distinguish between pre-hypnotic memory and post-hypnotic recall
following hypnosis." 8 Scientific evidence also revealed the difficulty in
effectively cross-examining a previously hypnotized witness because
hypnosis may artificially enhance the witness' confidence in the accu-
racy of his testimony." 9 The court, therefore, rejected the Harding
108. 311 N.C. 515, 319 S.E.2d 177 (1984).
109. The court agreed to re-evaluate its position due to "recent developments in the under-
standing of hypnosis as a tool to refresh or restore memory and the judicial trend away from
acceptance of hypnotically refreshed testimony." Id. at 519, 319 S.E.2d at 180.
110. 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978).
111. Id. at 119, 244 S.E.2d at 427.
112. 311 N.C. at 516, 319 S.E.2d at 178.
113. Id. at 517-18, 319 S.E.2d at 179.
114. Id. at 519, 319 S.E.2d at 180.
115. Id. at 520-24, 319 S.E.2d at 180-82.
116. The court discussed Orne, The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L J.
CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311 (1979), reprinted in CLINICAL HYPNOSIS: A MULTIDISCIPLI-
NARY APPROACH 497 (W. Wester & A. Smith eds. 1984); and Diamond, supra note 25. See Peoples,
311 N.C. at 520-24, 319 S.E.2d at 180-82.
117. Peoples, 311 N.C. at 524-31, 319 S.E.2d at 182-87.
118. Id. at 525-26, 319 S.E.2d at 183.
119. Id. at 526, 319 S.E.2d at 184. As stated by the court, "This false confidence may actually
nullify the safeguard of cross-examination." Id.
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credibility approach to hypnotically refreshed testimony as being un-
sound.120 Turning to the procedural safeguards alternative, the court
expressed similar reservations and concluded that safeguards cannot
prevent the witness from confusing hypnotic suggestions with actual
memory.' 2 The court held that the procedural safeguards approach was
not an acceptable means to test the reliability of hypnotically refreshed
testimony.'2 2 Instead, the court, based on its review of the scientific
commentary' 2' and case law indicating that hypnotically refreshed tes-
timony is too unreliable to be admitted as evidence in a judicial pro-
ceeding, embraced the inadmissibility option.' 24  North Carolina,
therefore, switched from a rule of per se admissibility to per se
inadmissibility.125
B. People v. Guerra
Like the North Carolina Supreme Court in Peoples, the California
Supreme Court in People v. Guerra re-evaluated its position on hypnot-
ically enhanced testimony.' 26 The court had decided People v. Shir-
ley 127 two years previously and had adopted the per se inadmissibility
approach.' 8 In Guerra a rape victim could recall only after undergoing
hypnosis that sexual penetration had taken place.' 29 After the trial
court admitted this testimony,10 the defendants appealed their convic-
120. Id. at 527, 319 S.E.2d at 184. The court questioned "the very foundation of the Harding
approach . . . since hypnotically refreshed testimony may well be completely unreliable." Id. at
526, 319 S.E.2d at 183.
121. Id. at 529, 319 S.E.2d at 185.
122. Id. at 529, 319 S.E.2d at 186.
123. Unlike other jurisdictions basing the per se inadmissibility approach on the Frye test,
see supra notes 46-72 and accompanying text, this court chose to apply only the theory underlying
Frye because it had "not specifically adopted the Frye test in this jurisdiction." Peoples, 311 N.C.
at 532, 319 S.E.2d at 187. See generally Note, Criminal Procedure-the Admissibility of Evidence
Obtained Through Hypnosis-State v. Peoples, 7 CAMPBELL L. REV. 409, 424-25 (1985).
124. Peoples, 311 N.C. at 531-32, 319 S.E.2d at 187. An important factor that influenced this
holding was the similar reversal in positions by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Collins
v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982) (overruling Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246
A.2d 302 (1968)). Peoples, 311 N.C. at 532, 319 S.E.2d at 187.
125. Peoples, 311 N.C. at 533, 319 S.E.2d at 188. The court, however, specified two limita-
tions on its adoption of per se inadmissibility. First, a person who has undergone pretrial hypnosis
may testify as to facts he related prior to hypnosis. Second, hypnosis may still be used in criminal
investigations, although the court suggested that hypnosis for this purpose should comply with the
Hurd procedural safeguards. Id.
126. 37 Cal. 3d 385, 690 P.2d 635, 208 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1984) (en banc).
127. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860
(1982).
128. See supra notes 53-68 and accompanying text.
129. Guerra, 37 Cal. 3d at 396-97, 690 P.2d at 641, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 168. Her memory appar-
ently was reduced by consumption of alcohol and use of marijuana prior to the alleged rape. Id. at
391-94, 690 P.2d at 637-39, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 164-66.
130. Id. at 397, 690 P.2d at 641, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
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tions on the basis of the Shirley decision.131 The central question con-
fronting the court was whether Shirley had retroactive effect to control
the case at hand.1 3 2 The court, after answering that question in the af-
firmative,133 responded to an attack by the State on the Shirley rule
itself.
The State argued that developments in the scientific literature af-
ter Shirley undermined the basis of that decision. 34 This argument as-
sumes that the Frye test demands unanimity among the scientific
community in order for a new technique to be reliable.13 5 The court,
however, held that the Frye test is satisfied whenever a clear majority
of the members of the relevant scientific community support the use of
the technique under scrutiny.13 6 In any event, the court found that
other studies conducted and articles written after Shirley'37 confirm the
conclusions reached in Shirley.35 The court concluded that this consen-
sus within the scientific community concerning the unreliability of re-
call enhanced by hypnosis had not changed since its Shirley ruling was
handed down."3 "
The court also answered the State's argument that many of the
courts following the inadmissibility approach permitted testimony per-
taining to facts remembered prior to hypnosis. The court refused to de-
part from its position in Shirley excluding pre-hypnotic testimony 40
131. Id. at 398, 690 P.2d at 642, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
132. Shirley itself left open the question of whether its principles would apply to "witnesses
hypnotized before the date of this decision [March 11, 1982]." See People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18,
67 n.53, 641 P.2d 775, 804 n.53, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 273 n.53 (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860
(1982). The rape victim in Guerra underwent hypnosis in March of 1979. Guerra, 37 Cal. 3d at
395, 690 P.2d at 640, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
133. For the Guerra court's analysis on this issue, see id. at 399-417, 690 P.2d at 643-56, 208
Cal. Rptr. at 169-82.
134. Id. at 419, 690 P.2d at 656-57, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 182-84. The State relied on two articles
written after Shirley, though not yet published, which purportedly support hypnotically refreshed
testimony.
135. Id. at 418, 690 P.2d at 656, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
136. Id.
137. For the Guerra court's discussion of these works, see id. at 419-24, 690 P.2d at 657-61,
208 Cal. Rptr. at 184-88.
138. Id. at 419, 690 P.2d at 657, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 184. The price to pay for increased recall
through hypnosis includes "increased errors and probably also an increase in the subject's mis-
placed confidence in those errors." Id. (discussing the reactions of a number of scientists and psy-
chologists to Shirley).
139. Id. at 424, 690 P.2d at 661, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 188. Similarly, the court rejected the
State's contention that the case law since Shirley had demonstrated a shift toward admissibility of
hypnotically refreshed testimony. Instead, the court held that the Shirley rule was drawing new
adherents. Id. at 426, 690 P.2d at 662, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
140. As the court noted, however, even Shirley recognized one exception to this principle.
The victim's prehypnotic testimony at a preliminary hearing would be admissible in place of testi-
mony at trial about topics covered during the hypnotic session. Id. at 427, 690 P.2d at 663, 208 Cal.
Rptr. at 190.
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because this testimony is given after hypnosis, making effective cross-
examination more difficult."' Accordingly, the court applied the Shir-
ley rule, holding that the motions to exclude the victim's testimony
were improperly denied by the trial court, and reversed the
convictions. 142
C. Contreras v. State
The Alaska Supreme Court in Contreras v. State143 faced for the
first time the issue of admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony.
The case stemmed from the indictment of Joseph Contreras on charges
of kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault. This indictment rested on
the post-hypnotic identification of Contreras by the complaining wit-
ness.14 4 The trial court granted a motion to suppress the complaining
witness' testimony, which had been enhanced by hypnosis. The appeals
court reversed, finding that hypnosis does not render a witness incom-
petent to testify.14 The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals decision and gave three reasons why hypnosis renders a wit-
ness' subsequent testimony inadmissible. 46
Initially, the court concluded that hypnosis fails to satisfy the test
established by Frye.147 The court viewed the Frye standard as two-fold:
first, the court must define the relevant scientific community; and sec-
ond, the court must evaluate whether a general consensus exists in that
field on the reliability of the type of scientific evidence in question.14 8
The court defined the relevant community as "the academic, scientific,
and medical or health-care professions which have studied and/or uti-
lized hypnosis."'1 49 The literature emanating from those professions con-
vinced the court that, because a consensus had not developed on what
141. Id. The court implied that room exists for future debate over the various subissues in
this general area: "It will be time enough to grapple with such questions in a case in which they are
presented as dispositive issues on a satisfactory record and after full briefing." Id. at 429, 690 P.2d
at 664, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
142. Id. at 429, 690 P.2d at 665, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 191. Concurring Justice Kaus vigorously
argued that a witness who has undergone pretrial hypnosis to improve recall "should generally be
permitted to testify at trial as to prehypnosis memories so long as there is satisfactory evidence
from which the trial court can determine that the witness did in fact recall and relate the state-
ments before undergoing hypnosis." Id. at 432, 690 P.2d at 667, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 194 (Kaus, J.,
concurring).
143. 718 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1986).
144. Id. at 130.
145. Id. at 129-31; see State v. Contreras, 674 P.2d 792 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
146. Contreras, 718 P.2d at 133-39.
147. Id. at 135.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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hypnosis is or does, 5 0 hypnosis is "far too underdeveloped" to satisfy
the Frye standard.' 5 '
The court also found that, even without Frye, hypnotically re-
freshed testimony must be excluded under Alaska Rule of Evidence
403,152 which may exclude even relevant evidence when its probative
value is outweighed by dangers of unfair prejudice or confusion.15 3
Whereas the Contreras trial court conducted a balancing inquiry that
emphasized the probative value of certain corroborative testimony, the
state supreme court was convinced that corroboration, even with strict
procedural safeguards during the hypnotic session, did not outweigh the
potential dangers inherent in hypnosis.15 4 Because expert testimony is
an insufficient remedy to minimize the potential of prejudicing the de-
fendant by misleading the jury, 55 the higher court concluded that "the
prejudice/probity balance weighs per se in favor of exclusion."'1 5 6
Finally, the supreme court found that the constitutional right of a
criminal defendant to confront opposing witnesses precluded admission
of hypnotically refreshed testimony. 5 7 The court explained that the
two chief interests underlying this right-the opportunities to cross-ex-
amine the witness and to demonstrate the witness' demeanor when con-
fronted by the defendant' 58-were effectively negated by the lasting
imprint that hypnosis leaves on a witness' memory.'59 The court analo-
gized hypnotically induced testimony to the category of hearsay in
which the declarant must be unavailable' 60 and the declarant's state-
ments have adequate indicia of reliability before the evidence would be
150. Id. at 136. The court was quick to point out that in searching for such a consensus, "it is
not this court's duty to decide which side of the debate is correct, but rather to determine if there
is sufficient consensus on the reliability of hypnotically aided recall to determine whether it is
generally accepted." Id. at 135-36.
151. Id. at 136.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 136 n.22. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is identical in this regard. See infra notes
241-42 and accompanying text.
154. Contreras, 674 P.2d at 138.
155. Id.
156. Id. The court rejected a case-by-case approach under Rule 403 because such an ap-
proach "is time consuming, creates a risk of non-uniform results and requires judges to become
hypnosis experts in order to make intelligent determinations about the efficacy of particular proce-
dural safeguards and about whether there is in fact substantial compliance with those safeguards."
Id. at 137-38.
157. Id. at 138; see also ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 11.
158. Contreras, 718 P.2d at 138; see Lemon v. State, 514 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Alaska 1973).
159. As stated by the Contreras court: "A witness's natural sincerity may be irreparably al-
tered by hypnosis. Moreover, hypnosis can also affect the witness' normal demeanor in a manner
favoring the prosecution." 718 P.2d at 138.
160. A witness is unavailable when a good faith effort falls to obtain the witness' presence at
trial. Id. at 138-39; see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980).
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admissible under the confrontation clause. 161 Just as the State failed to
show unavailability by utilizing other investigative tools before resort-
ing to hypnosis,'62 so also did the corroborative statements fail to sat-
isfy the indicia of reliability requirement. 163 Given also that a witness'
demeanor can be altered by hypnosis, the court concluded that the de-
fendants were deprived of their constitutional right of confrontation
under the Alaska Constitution by the trial court's admission of hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony.'1 Thus, Contreras establishes three entirely
distinct bases upon which hypnotically refreshed testimony may be
excluded.16 5
D. Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp.,'66 like the Alaska Supreme
Court in Contreras, decided whether to admit hypnotically enhanced
testimony for the first time. The defendant in this products liability
and negligence action based its appeal in part'6 7 on the trial court's ad-
mission of hypnotically refreshed testimony. Specifically, the driver of
the car in question testified, after hypnosis, that he had applied his
brakes just prior to the accident.6 8
The court began its analysis by noting concerns about the forensic
use of hypnosis. 69 Next, the court summarized the three approaches
adopted by state courts1 0 and discussed the Fifth Circuit's ruling in
Valdez. 17 1 The court stated that Valdez had adopted Hurd's procedural
safeguards approach in conjunction with the balancing test of Federal
Rule of Evidence 403.1712 The court then opted for a similar hybrid ap-
161. Contreras, 718 P.2d at 138; see Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66; see also FED. R. Evin. 804.
162. Contreras, 718 P.2d at 139.
163. Id. The court refused to focus on certain allegedly corroborative statements to avoid the
danger of "bootstrapping unreliable testimony." Id.
164. Id.
165. The court concluded its opinion by adopting the position espoused by the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court in Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 319 S.E.2d 177 (1984), regarding both the admissibil-
ity of testimony on facts related before the hypnotic session and the permissible use of hypnosis as
an investigative tool. Contreras, 718 P.2d at 139-40; see supra note 125 and accompanying text.
166. 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1263 (1986).
167. The defendant also claimed error in the trial court's admission of videotapes of the
driver's hypnotic session. The court found this contention valid. See id. at 1116-18.
168. Id. at 1118. Prior to hypnosis, the driver stated that he did not apply the brakes at all.
Id. at 1115.
169. Id. at 1119-20.
170. Id. at 1120-22.
171. See United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984); see also supra notes 96-103
and accompanying text.
172. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1122. The court noted:
Although the Valdez court held in that particular case that post-hypnosis testimony in which
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proach. 17 3 Reluctant to establish either a per se rule of admissibility or
inadmissibility, the court instead adopted a flexible case-by-case ap-
proach allowing discretion to the district court.174
Accordingly, Sprynczynatyk outlines a two-step procedure by
which the district court initially must decide whether the hypnotically
enhanced testimony is sufficiently reliable to be admissible. 17 5 First, the
district court must determine whether the hypnosis complied with the
Eighth Circuit version of the Hurd procedural safeguards test. 7 Sec-
ond, the district court then must assess whether in view of all the cir-
cumstances, the probative value of the proposed testimony outweighs
its prejudicial effect. 7 7
a hypnotized witness identifies for the first time a person he knew was already under suspi-
cion is inadmissible in a criminal trial, the court stated that if adequate procedural safeguards
have been followed, corroborated post-hypnotic testimony might be admissible if the proba-
tive value of the testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect.
Id. For the text of Rule 403, see infra note 241.
173. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1122.
174. According to the court, a rule of per se admissibility "does not cure the risks of undue
prejudice and jury confusion," but "[a] rule of per se inadmissibility is impermissibly broad and
may result in the exclusion of valuable and accurate evidence in some cases." Id.
175. Id. at 1122-23.
176. The Eighth Circuit version states:
(1) The hypnotic session should be conducted by an impartial licensed psychiatrist or psy-
chologist trained in the use of hypnosis. . . . Appointment of the psychiatrist or psychologist
should first be approved by the trial court .... (2) Information given to the hypnotist by
either party concerning the case should be noted, preferably in written form . . . . (3) Before
hypnosis, the hypnotist should obtain a detailed description of the facts from the subject
.... (4) The session should be recorded. . . . Videotape is a preferable method of recorda-
tion. (5) Preferably, only the hypnotist and subject should be present during any phase of the
hypnotic session, but other persons should be allowed to attend if their attendance can be
shown to be essential and steps are taken to prevent their influencing the results of the
session.
Id. at 1123 n.14.
The court cautioned, however, that the adoption of these Hurd-like safeguards does not mean
that total compliance results in automatic admissibility or that incomplete compliance results in
automatic exclusion. Id. at 1123 n.15. Courts also should consider "the appropriateness of using
hypnosis for the kind of memory loss involved, and whether there is any evidence to corroborate
the hypnotically enhanced testimony." Id. at 1123; see also supra note 174 and accompanying text.
177. Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1123. The court summarized this process by stating that
"the district court should, before trial, scrutinize the circumstances surrounding the hypnosis ses-
sion, consider whether the safeguards we have approved were followed and determine in light of all
the circumstances if the proposed hypnotically enhanced testimony is sufficiently reliable and not
overly prejudicial to be admitted." Id. The latter determination is essentially the balancing test
embodied in Rule 403. As the court explained, the district court ultimately must decide "whether
the risk that the testimony reflects a distorted memory is so great that the probative value of the
testimony is destroyed." Id.; see infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text. In the event the dis-
trict court found inadmissible the testimony relating to the application of the brakes, the Eighth
Circuit nevertheless would deem admissible any testimony as to pre-hypnosis recollections that is
"uncontaminated by hypnosis." Sprynczynatyk, 771 F.2d at 1123. In Sprynczynatyk, the court
reversed and remanded for a new trial, instructing the district court to conduct pretrial proceed-
ings as outlined above.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Even after the highest courts in Minnesota and California held in
the early 1980s that testimony enhanced by the use of pretrial hypnosis
is inadmissible per se,7 8 many state courts continued to admit this tes-
timony. Similarly, the 1984 Fifth Circuit decision in Valdez, which de-
parted from the per se admissibility rule,""9 was only one case compared
to several others favoring liberal admission. However, recent decisions
by the state supreme courts of North Carolina, California, and
Alaska, 8 0  together with the Eighth Circuit's ruling in
Sprynczynatyk,' s' demonstrate a trend away from per se admissibility
and a movement toward per se inadmissibility. Per se inadmissibility
not only has replaced per se admissibility as the majority rule in the
states, but also is becoming more acceptable to the federal courts.'8 2
The following sections delineate the significant faults inherent in the
use of hypnosis for testimonial purposes and suggest two distinct ana-
lytical frameworks for state and federal courts to follow in finding hyp-
notically refreshed testimony inadmissible.
A. Scientific Discouragement of Improper Forensic Use of Hypnosis
The scientific community, upon which the Frye test of inadmissi-
bility places considerable emphasis,8 3 has produced much literature at-
tacking the over-utilization of hypnosis for forensic purposes. Almost all
scientists now reject the once accepted "videotape" theory of hypnosis,
which holds that memories are "recorded" in the human mind, as if on
video tape, and under hypnosis can be "played back" in precise detail
to refresh the subject's recall.184 With few dissenters,'85 the scientific
178. See supra notes 48-68 and accompanying text.
179. See United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984); see also supra notes 96-103
and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 108-65 and accompanying text.
181. See Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 1263 (1986); see also supra notes 166-77 and accompanying text.
182. Even one state court that recently opted for a procedural safeguards approach recog-
nized that "the vast majority of states have ruled that a witness who has been hypnotized is in-
competent to testify to the events which were the subject of the hypnosis session." See State v.
Johnston, No. 412 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 6, 1986).
183. See supra notes 46-72 and accompanying text.
184. Kingston, Admissibility of Post-Hypnotic Testimony, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Apr.
1986, at 23.
185. A leading advocate of the videotape theory is Dr. Martin Reiser, director of behavioral
science services for the Los Angeles Police Department and director of the Law Enforcement Hyp-
nosis Institute. See generally M. REISER, HANDBOOK OF INVESTIGATIVE HYPNOSIS (1980). Dr. Reiser
has trained more than 1000 people, mostly police, to perform hypnosis. Stark, Hypnosis on Trial,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Feb. 1984, at 36. Until People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 243 (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982); see supra notes 53-68 and accompanying
text, Dr. Reiser had been using hypnotically refreshed testimony in court 100 to 200 times per
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community follows the "reconstructive" theory. This theory contends
that a person's memory constantly changes in response both to external
stimuli and that person's own thoughts.186 Thus, memory is "recon-
structive as well as reproductive. ' 187 This assumption underlies the ma-
jor articles written and studies conducted by scientists who caution
against an overly broad use of potentially unreliable hypnotically en-
hanced recall.
1. The Primary Articles
Drs. Bernard Diamond'88 and Martin Orne'89 are the leading scien-
tific spokesmen opposing the admission of hypnotically enhanced testi-
mony. Dr. Diamond argues that hypnosis renders a potential witness
incompetent to testify by "contaminating" the person's memory. 90 He
notes that "insurmountable evidentiary problems" are created by hyp-
notically refreshed testimony because a hypnotist cannot avoid im-
planting suggestions in the mind of the subject.' 9' The subject of
hypnosis usually will not recognize that the hypnotist has implanted a
suggestion.9 2 More importantly, a hypnotized subject will try to please
the hypnotist 93 by confabulation, the fabrication of missing details to
fill in gaps of memory loss.19 4 Hypnosis also can produce subtle but
highly significant distortions of memory that will linger long after the
hypnotic session ends. 195 Having resolved doubts and uncertainties,
year. Hilts, Psychology Group Seeks to Curb Use of Hypnosis, Wash. Post, Aug. 29, 1986, at A3,
col. 1.
186. Stark, supra note 185, at 35. For a good analysis of this overall debate, see Shirley, 31
Cal. 3d at 57-62, 641 P.2d at 798-801, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 266-70.
187. Orne, supra note 116, at 507. In short, the human mind "is continuously being altered
in the interests of the present." Ruffra, Hypnotically Induced Testimony: Should it Be Admitted?,
19 CRIM. L. BULL. 293, 294 (1983).
188. Dr. Diamond is a clinical professor of psychiatry at the University of California, San
Francisco, and a professor of law at the University of California, Berkeley.
189. Dr. Orne is the director of the Unit for Experimental Psychiatry at the Institute of
Pennsylvania Hospital and a professor of psychiatry. Dr. Orne is also the president of the Interna-
tional Society of Hypnosis, the editor of the International Journal of Clinical and Experimental
Hypnosis, and the senior author of the hypnosis article in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrrANICA 133-40 (5th
ed. 1976).
190. Diamond, supra note 25, at 314.
191. Id. at 332-33.
192. Id. at 333-34. Moreover, according to Diamond, "this misperception will withstand the
most vigorous cross-examination." Id. at 334.
193. Id. at 333.
194. Id. at 335. The hypnotically enhanced recall is likely "to be a mosaic of (1) appropriate
actual events, (2) entirely irrelevant actual events, (3) pure fantasy, and (4) fantasized details sup-
plied to make a logical whole." Id. Furthermore, even "detailed recall can be totally confabulated."
Id. at 337-38.
195. Id. at 336. Moreover, "time, rather than weakening the effects of the hypnotic distor-
tion, tends if anything to fix it into a permanent pattern." Id.
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hypnosis may lend confidence to the witness' tainted recall.19 There-
fore, Dr. Diamond asserts that hypnotically refreshed testimony is not
reliable and should be excluded on the ground that the witness is in-
competent to testify.19 7
Dr. Orne similarly argues against broad admission of hypnotically
enhanced testimony, preferring instead that hypnosis be used simply
for investigative purposes.198 Emphasizing the dangers of confabulation,
Dr. Orne states that typically the subject will become convinced
through suggestions that he has experienced total recall. 9 9 Accordingly,
any gaps or uncertainties in the subject's memory are now filled in, and
the events as they were relived in hypnosis become the witness' recol-
lection of what actually occurred on the day in question.2 00 Thus, the
hypnotically refreshed witness is usually unable to distinguish between
pre- and post-hypnosis memories, 20 1 and the witness' testimony is in-
correctly perceived by the jury as a reflection of original memory.0 2
Dr. Orne advocates limiting the forensic use of hypnosis to the in-
vestigative context.23 If hypnosis is used for testimonial purposes, how-
ever, Dr. Orne insists that safeguards be implemented to minimize the
dangers of unreliability.20 4 Dr. Orne's suggestions provided the basis for
the Hurd procedural safeguards, 20 5 an approach with which Dr. Orne
now disagrees. 208 Dr. Orne criticizes Hurd by arguing that while pro-
posed safeguards can assist in determining what was done during the
hypnotic session, they do not prevent witnesses from confusing dis-
torted hypnotic memories with prior and subsequent nonhypnotic im-
196. Id. at 339.
197. Id. at 349.
198. Orne, supra note 116.
199. "Under these circumstances, he will typically awaken and confound the hypnotic memo-
ries with his waking memories." Id. at 506. In other words, "[s]uch suggestions result in the indi-
vidual's tending to accept the events he relived in hypnosis as if they were what actually
happened." Id. For a good example of this phenomenon, see infra notes 216-19 and accompanying
text.
200. Orne, supra note 116, at 506-07. "Such a pseudo memory may persist like any other
memory even though it can be totally false." Hypnosis, supra note 5, at 67.
201. Orne, supra note 116, at 507. As Orne stated: "Instead of differentiating between his
earlier fragmentary recall and the gaps that have been filled in-perhaps by pseudomemories cre-
ated during hypnosis-he experiences the totality as his recollection of what had originally tran-
spired." Id. And generally speaking, "it is difficult to disentangle which aspects of hypnotically
enhanced memories represent accurate recall and which represent fantasies that are confabulated
to approximate what might have occurred." Id. at 508.
202. Id. at 507.
203. It is in this context that hypnotic techniques are most appropriately employed. Id. at
513.
204. See id. at 521-22.
205. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
206. Orne, Soskis, Dinges & Orne, Hypnotically Induced Testimony, in EYEWITNESS TESTI-
MONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 171 (G. Wells & E. Loftus eds. 1984).
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pressions or from placing undue confidence in distorted post-hypnotic
recollections. 0 Pretrial hypnosis should be permitted only in the lim-
ited circumstances of assisting criminal investigations,0 8 provided the
hypnotic session complies with certain safeguards. 0 9 Therefore, Dr.
Orne clearly has placed himself in line with the increasing number of
state supreme courts that have held hypnotically induced testimony
inadmissible per se.210
2. Recent Scientific Studies
Two recent studies conducted by other members of the scientific
community confirm and expand upon the concerns about hypnotically
enhanced recall expressed by Drs. Diamond and Orne. The first, a hyp-
notic hypermnesia experiment, 21' tested both the number of additional
items recalled and the accuracy of those recollections. 1 2 The results
were startling: although the hypnotized subjects recalled twice as many
items as their unhypnotized counterparts, the hypnotized subjects
made three times as many errors .21  The direct implication is that the
use of hypnosis produces more recall but that this recall often is mis-
taken. One possible explanation for this mistaken recall is that the hyp-
notized subject is less cautious in reporting memories.214 The scientists
conducting this experiment urge that the results of their study should
discourage the use of hypnosis when the truth of information is the pri-
mary concern. 215
207. Id. at 210.
208. Id. at 195-96.
209. The authors grouped these recommended guidelines under 10 headings, closely parallel-
ing in certain instances the Hurd safeguards. See id. at 204-10. In all, the authors argued that it is
"crucial to follow procedures that provide a detailed record of precisely what has or has not been
discussed in the hypnotic interview, and to show that every effort has been made to minimize the
potential effect of hypnosis in distorting memory." Id. at 205.
210. See id. at 204. "The present state of scientific knowledge is consistent with the rulings
of a number of state supreme courts that memories retrieved through hypnosis are sufficiently
unreliable that their use is precluded as eyewitness testimony in criminal trials." Id. However, Dr.
Orne agrees with the Supreme Court ruling in Rock, see supra note 9 and accompanying text, that
a criminal defendant should be able to testify as to topics covered by a hypnotic session. As Dr.
Orne has explained, "the judge or jury takes into account that [the defendant] is putting his best
foot forward." Stewart, supra note 9, at 57.
211. Dywan & Bowers, The Use of Hypnosis to Enhance Recall, 222 SCIENCE 184 (1983).
212. This experiment consisted of exposing a group of subjects to certain material and then
testing their recall, first normally and then by hypnotizing half of the group. If the hypnotized
subjects can recall more than their unhypnotized counterparts, the difference is considered evi-
dence of hypnotic hypermnesia. People v. Guerra, 37 Cal. 3d 385, 418 n.31, 690 P.2d 635, 657 n.31,
208 Cal. Rptr. 162, 184 n.31 (1984) (en banc).
213. Id. at 184-85.
214. Id. at 185.
215. Id.
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The second study216 tested whether a pseudomemory could be im-
planted successfully through hypnosis. Each member of a group of
twenty-seven subjects was asked to select a night on which they could
not remember dreaming or anything out of the ordinary. The subjects
then underwent hypnosis, during which they were asked whether they
had heard any noise loud enough to awaken them during that particular
night. Seventeen of the twenty-seven reported, while still under hypno-
sis, that they did hear such a noise; thirteen of the subjects maintained
this position after being dehypnotized.2 17 Those thirteen maintained
this belief even after being informed that the noise had been merely a
hypnotic suggestion.21s These results support Dr. Orne's position that a
witness' memory can be modified unknowingly by means of hypnosis
and that an initially unsure witness can become more credible after a
hypnotic memory "refreshment." 1 "
The articles by Drs. Diamond and Orne, when read in conjunction
with these two recent studies, provide scientific justification to reject
hypnotically enhanced testimony as thoroughly unreliable. Very few in-
formed psychiatrists or psychologists would advocate hypnosis as a
valid means of refreshing a witness' memory to testify in court. Rather,
the trend in the medical community is clearly toward exclusion, as evi-
denced by recent resolutions by the American Medical Association
220
and the American Psychological Association. 2
216. Laurence & Perry, Hypnotically Created Memory Among Highly Hypnotizable Sub-
jects, 222 SCIENCE 523 (1983).
217. Id. at 524.
218. Id. Said one subject, "I'm pretty damned certain. I'm positive I heard those noises." Id.
219. Id. In a real life situation, the authors conclude, when the witness is more emotionally
involved and motivated to cooperate, his "'recall' could lead to a false but positive identification
and to all of the legal procedures and penalties that this implies." Id.
220. An American Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs committee, headed by
Dr. Orne, declared in December 1984 that "recollections under hypnosis are too shaky for the
witness stand." Ritter, Hypnotized Witnesses Spark Legal Dilemmas, L.A. Times, Feb. 10, 1985
§ I, at 2, col. 6 (quoting the AMA Committee). The committee found "no evidence to indicate that
there is an increase of only accurate memory during hypnosis [and that] there is no way for either
subject or hypnotist to distinguish between those recollections which may be accurate and those
which may be pseudomemories." Id. The same committee, in April 1985, similarly concluded that
"recall of past events, even ones that are traumatic, does not improve with hypnosis." Use of
Hypnosis To Aid Memory Faulted By AMA, Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 1985, at A5, col. 1. The panel
recommended that hypnosis be limited to investigations and be conducted by qualified psycholo-
gists or psychiatrists. Id.
221. The American Psychological Association's policymaking council approved a resolution
in August 1986 declaring that nonprofessionals should not use or be trained to use hypnosis, a
position directly affecting 5000 to 10,000 police officers already trained to use hypnosis. Hilts,
supra note 185, at A3, col. 1.
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B. Judicial Rejection of Testimony Enhanced by Pretrial Hypnosis
The evidence accumulated by the relevant scientific community
leads to an unmistakable conclusion: The use of hypnosis to enhance a
witness' ability to testify in court taints that testimony and renders it
inadmissible. The remaining question concerns which legal framework a
state or federal court may use to exclude hypnotically refreshed testi-
mony. State courts generally align themselves with one of three distinct
approaches when confronted with this issue: the Harding credibility po-
sition,222 the Hurd procedural safeguards approach,223 or the Frye gen-
eral acceptance stance.224 Although federal courts historically have
followed the Harding credibility approach,225 they recently have shown
a willingness to find hypnotically enhanced testimony inadmissible
under certain circumstances. 226 The following analysis (1) supports the
trend in state courts toward per se admissibility under Frye and its
general acceptance in the scientific community and (2) urges the federal
courts to move away from Harding toward outright inadmissibility by
relying on Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
1. The State Courts: Inadmissibility Based on Frye
Neither Harding nor Hurd demonstrates a realistic understanding
of hypnosis as a means of refreshing a witness' memory. Harding's
treatment of hypnosis as another case of present recollection refreshed
ignores the basic fact that refreshing a witness' memory by means of a
document is far simpler analytically than attempting to refresh the
same witness' memory through hypnosis. This distinction is evident in
the two traditional safeguards underlying the present recollection re-
freshed doctrine: courts (1) may bar certain writings from refreshing a
witness' memory and (2) require that opposing parties be allowed to
inspect any writing permitted, cross-examine the witness thereon, and
introduce into evidence portions of the writing relating to the witness'
testimony.221 7 Because the hypnotic session is conducted outside of the
courtroom and is an ephemeral means of refreshing memory, neither of
these safeguards are present to protect the opposing party.228
More importantly, hypnosis to refresh a witness' memory calls into
question the Harding principle itself under which the matter of hypno-
222. See supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 46-72 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild
Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974); see also supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
227. Note, supra note 31, at 233.
228. Id. at 244-45.
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sis should affect only the credibility of the witness' testimony. A witness
who has memory gaps and confabulates during hypnosis may become
convinced that any posthypnotic recall is accurate. Moreover, meaning-
ful cross-examination would no longer be available to attack the credi-
bility and the accuracy of the witness' recall;129 thus, the Harding
approach obstructs the traditional protections provided by cross-
examination.
Hurd also subsists on a faulty premise. The Hurd court based its
procedural safeguards position on the expectation that, if used prop-
erly, hypnosis can restore a witness' memory to a level "comparable to
normal recall in its accuracy. '230 The scientific literature, however,
reveals that hypnotically enhanced memory is unlike an ordinary eye-
witness' memory. The fact that a witness' recall can be influenced so
easily and even irrevocably altered by a hypnotist's suggestion reveals
the danger that once a person undergoes hypnosis, that person's mem-
ory on the topics covered during the session will never again be compa-
rable to normal recall. Thus, the scientific evidence indicates that
hypnotically refreshed recall and normal recall are by nature irreconcil-
able concepts.
Moreover, Dr. Orne, the scientist who first proposed the Hurd pro-
cedural guidelines,2 1 now rejects those safeguards as a means of ensur-
ing the reliability of hypnotically enhanced testimony. Dr. Orne values
the guidelines only as an aid in determining exactly what the hypnotic
session entailed. These guidelines do not prevent the subject from con-
fusing pre-hypnosis with post-hypnosis memories, the latter having
been altered by the procedure.3 2 Despite these safeguards, the subject
may place "undue confidence" in "distorted recollections. 2 3 The opin-
ions an inventor has on the effectiveness of his invention should be
given considerable weight; likewise, Dr. Orne's concern that his guide-
lines do not ensure reliability demands special respect and attention by
courts considering reliance on these safeguards.
Courts following the Hurd approach should join a growing number
of state courts that have adopted a per se inadmissibility approach
founded on Frye's test of general scientific acceptance. Although some
may question whether Frye is even relevant to hypnotically refreshed
229. Note, Excluding Hypnotically Induced Testimony on the "Hearsay Rationale," 20 VAL.
U.L. REV. 619, 634 (1986). After hypnosis, "a witness' veracity for his posthypnotic memory may be
so strong at trial that ordinary indicia of unreliability brought out during cross-examination are
erased." Id. at 633. In contrast, "[d]uring cross-examination, most witnesses not subjected to pre-
trial hypnosis will communicate uncertainties concerning their recall of an event." Id.
230. State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 538, 432 A.2d 86, 92 (1981).
231. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
232. Orne, Soskis, Dinges & Orne, supra note 206, at 210.
233. Id.
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testimony,13 4 past application of Frye indicates that its use in this con-
text is a logical extension of Frye's purpose-to ensure the reliability of
testimony. 35 As the California Supreme Court once noted, Frye serves
the "salutary purpose of preventing the jury from being misled by un-
proven and ultimately unsound scientific methods."236 Although Frye
imposes a substantial barrier to the admission of potentially relevant
evidence, 3 7 the occasional exclusion of relevant evidence is a small
price to pay for ensuring integrity in the confrontational aspect of the
legal system. By adhering to a Frye threshold test, a court can decide
any reliability question quickly and uniformly.3 8 This test guarantees
that one side will not be prejudiced by the improper admission of evi-
dence derived from an unaccepted scientific technique. All state courts,
therefore, should adhere to the Frye approach by excluding inherently
unreliable testimony produced through hypnotic means of memory
refreshment. 3 9
2. The Federal Courts: Inadmissibility Based on Federal Rule of
Evidence 403
The enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which went into
effect in 1975, conceivably prevents the federal courts from adopting a
Frye test of general scientific acceptance to find hypnotically refreshed
234. The Frye standard technically is concerned with the admissibility of expert opinion de-
duced from the results of a new scientific technique. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.
Cir. 1923).
235. See generally E. CLEARY, supra note 4, § 203.
236. People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 53, 641 P.2d 775, 795, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 264 (en banc),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982). See generally supra notes 53-68 and accompanying text.
237. See Dilloff, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Influenced Testimony, 4 Omo N.U.L.
REv. 1, 21 (1977).
238. As one commentator aptly noted: "When another approach is taken, there exists the
danger that the reliability of a particular technique will become the central issue in each case,
distracting the fact finder from the underlying merits of the case. In addition, a case-by-case deter-
mination would encourage hopeless disharmony in the lower courts. . " Ruffra, supra note 187,
at 316.
239. This Recent Development endorses the four limitations on per se inadmissibility out-
lined in People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243 (en banc), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 860 (1982), particularly regarding the use of hypnosis for investigative purposes. See supra
notes 66-67 and accompanying text. The use of hypnosis should be subject, of course, to substan-
tial compliance with the guidelines recently recommended by Dr. Orne and his colleagues. See
supra note 209 and accompanying text. In this regard, law enforcement officials in jurisdictions
which have not established a clear position in this area will face a dilemma. As one commentator
noted:
[I]nvestigators who wish to use hypnosis as an investigative tool are placed in the unenviable
position of having to guess whether the testimony of a witness who has undergone hypnosis
will be admissible in court. . . .Therefore, law enforcement officials should be selective in
their use of hypnosis and should follow procedures that grant them the greatest likelihood of
admissibility.
Kingston, supra note 184, at 28.
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testimony inadmissible per se. According to some commentators, Rule
703, with its "reasonable reliance" standard for certain expert testi-
mony, implicitly abolished the Frye standard.2 40 Federal courts skepti-
cal about hypnotically enhanced evidence, therefore, should utilize an
alternative framework of analysis, Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.24' Under this analysis, as with any other type of evidence, a
court would analyze both the probative value of the evidence and the
detrimental effects of its admission.242
In Valdez the Fifth Circuit became the first federal court to adopt
this case-by-case approach to hypnotically refreshed testimony.4 3 The
Eighth Circuit subsequently adopted a similar approach in
Sprynczynatyk.2 " Both cases reveal a growing reluctance to admit au-
tomatically testimony that has been hypnotically refreshed. 245 The
Valdez court stated a rule of per se inadmissibility limited to certain
cases involving personal identification, with the use or nonuse of proper
procedures during hypnosis affecting the admissibility of other kinds of
testimony. In contrast, the Sprynczynatyk court expressly created a hy-
brid approach, combining Hurd's procedural safeguards and Rule 403's
balancing approach.
Clearly, the federal courts are heading in the right direction. Rule
403 is the proper vehicle for this movement.246 The scientific commu-
240. Rule 703 permits experts to rely on facts or data not otherwise admissible as long as
they are "reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." FED. R. EVID. 703; see also FED.
R. EVID. 702. According to Professor McCormick, "reasonable reliance" is not synonymous with the
Frye standard of "general acceptance." E. CLEARY, supra note 4, § 203, at 607. The commentators
also observe that Rule 703 fails to address Frye. For a general discussion of this argument, see
Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1228-31 (1980). See also Hawthorne v. State, 470 So. 2d 770, 782-87
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (Ervin, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
241. FED. R. EvID. 403 reads as follows:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
242. Note, supra note 19, at 1220.
243. United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984); see supra notes 96-103 and ac-
companying text.
244. Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 1263 (1986); see supra notes 166-77 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text. It is unfortunate that the federal courts
lag behind the states on this issue. The cause of this developmental gap, as explained recently by a
New York attorney, is that the federal courts "deal with cases involving hypnosis so infrequently."
Coyle, Use of Hypnosis Still a Puzzle to Nation's Courts, Nat'l Law J., June 8, 1987, at 1, col. 4 &
at 20, cols. 3-4 (quoting Ira Mickenberg, former professor of law, University of Dayton). Regard-
less, this author shares the attorney's frustration: "I can't see any reason why the federal rule
should be any different than the majority rule in the states." Id. at 20, col. 4.
246. To the extent that a state has adopted a variation of the Federal Rules of Evidence
supplanting Frye, the state should analyze the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony
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nity has established persuasively that hypnotically refreshed testimony
is unreliable. Even though an approach based on Rule 403 does not pos-
sess the benefits of a uniform rule of per se inadmissibility based on
Frye, the rule is the best device available under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.247 If the decisions of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits are any
indication, federal courts will apply Rule 403 stringently against hyp-
notically enhanced testimony. These courts recognized the prejudicial
impact that admission of this testimony can have in misleading a
jury.248  Thus, all federal courts should adopt the Valdez-
Sprynczynatyk approach to exclude on the basis of Rule 403 any testi-
mony tainted by the pretrial use of hypnosis to enhance recall.2 49
with Rule 403. These states, through a different vehicle, should nevertheless reach the same result
as before. As Professor McCormick has opined, the courts that have adopted "a strict exclusionary
rule" under Frye should "probably" reach the same result "by inquiring directly into the relative
costs and benefits of the testimony." E. CLEARY, supra note 4, § 206, at 633. The Alaska Supreme
Court in Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1986), see supra notes 143-65 and accompanying
text, provided a model of how a state court can apply its own Rule 403 to find such testimony
inadmissible. Of course, the court refused to interpret the silence regarding the Frye test to indi-
cate that Frye is no longer good law. The Contreras court "believe[d] it unlikely that this silence
was meant to overturn long-established rules of admissibility based on Frye." 718 P.2d at 136.
247. One commentator would exclude hypnotically enhanced testimony for the same reasons
that hearsay testimony is excluded. "This is not to say that hypnotically induced testimony should
be excluded as hearsay, but that it should be excluded on the rationale which excludes hearsay
testimony." See Note, supra note 229, at 624. However, it would seem preferable for a judge to
exclude such evidence under a specific rule, like Rule 403, rather than refer to nebulous policy
grounds more susceptible to attack on appeal. In the alternative, one could base a claim on behalf
of a criminal defendant on the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VI. This kind of claim has succeeded at the state level. See Contreras, 718 P.2d at 138; see
also supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text. Finally, one could argue cogently that admission
of hypnotically induced testimony violates due process under either the fifth or fourteenth amend-
ments. See, e.g., Little v. Armontrout, 819 F.2d 1425 (8th Cir.), 835 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1987).
248. Hypnosis, supra note 5, at 67. The famous hypnotist known as "The Amazing Kreskin"
immediately criticized the United States Supreme Court ruling permitting previously hypnotized
criminal defendants to testify, see Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987); see also supra note 9
and accompanying text, by arguing against the effectiveness and the very validity of hypnosis.
"Amazing Kreskin" Challenges Supreme Court Hypnosis Ruling, UPI wire, June 23, 1987 (availa-
ble on NEXIS). Stating that his act is not based on hypnotic trances, but rather manipulation of
the mind and imagination, Kreskin declared that allowing testimony based on hypnotism "can just
open a Pandora's box in the court room. . .My feeling is that, in something as serious as criminal
investigations, the business of believing that you can put people into a trance is playing with wild-
fire." Id. Kreskin is offering $100,000 to anyone who can prove that he is wrong and hypnotism is
not a sham. Id.
249. Since these two cases were decided, there has been further, if somewhat uneven, devel-
opment along the same line. The Eighth Circuit has itself boosted the Valdez-Sprynczynatyk ap-
proach. In Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1987), the full court, in a 9-0 decision, held
that the denial of a state-provided expert on hypnosis to assist Little, an indigent defendant, ren-
dered his trial fundamentally unfair, requiring his conviction to be set aside. The court thereby
extended the protections of indigent defendants first recognized in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12(1956) and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). In the process, the court perceived the dan-
gers in allowing the state to present its own expert at the suppression hearing considering the
admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony without providing at the state's expense "a simi-
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V. CONCLUSION
The trend toward greater inadmissibility of hypnotically refreshed
testimony displayed by state and federal courts is a positive outgrowth
of increasing scientific criticism of this specific forensic use of hypnosis.
State courts using the Frye test will find that the use of hypnosis to
refresh a witness' recall for subsequent testimony in court has been re-
jected by the relevant scientific community as being too unreliable,
even with the most intricate procedural safeguards. Federal courts, un-
fortunately, are unable to rely on Frye because the Federal Rules of
Evidence may preempt the Frye test. Rule 403, however, provides a suf-
ficient means to reach the same end sought under Frye. By finding that
the prejudicial impact inherent in admitting hypnotically enhanced tes-
timony outweighs its probative value, federal courts will reach a result
identical to that under Frye's conclusion that the testimony is
inadmissible.
Michael J. Beaudine
lar weapon to the defendant." Underlying this ruling was the court's concern over the three-fold
"perils" of such testimony, namely the potential for confabulation, suggestibility, and memory-
hardening. Little, 835 F.2d at 1244; see supra notes 188-210 and accompanying text.
Unfortunately, other circuit courts of appeal have not come as far as the Fifth and Eighth
Circuits, although they do show promise. For example, the Fourth Circuit avoids any per se rules,
preferring instead to focus on "whether the in-court testimony of a previously hypnotized witness
has a basis which is in fact independent of hypnotic influence." Harker v. Maryland, 800 F.2d 437,
441 (4th Cir. 1986); accord McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1987). Similarly, the Sev-
enth Circuit currently gives "careful scrutiny" to whether under the circumstances there was "any
likelihood" that "the effect, if any, of hypnosis on the evidence was unfair." United States v. Kim-
berlin, 805 F.2d 210, 219 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3270 (1987). Although the Seventh
Circuit has declined to adopt the Hurd safeguards, it has suggested that more specific rules "may
evolve in this circuit." Id. The court has laid the groundwork: "We recognize that adherence to
[Hurd] standards would be prophylactic against the dangers of the use of hypnosis, and would aid
courts in making determinations concerning the reliability of the testimony of persons who had
been under hypnosis." Id. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has held that "[a] reviewing court must
determine whether safeguards have been employed to insure reliability of the testimony to make it
admissible." Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501, 1508 (10th Cir. 1987). Finally, the Sixth Circuit,
in Beck v. Norris, 801 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1986), effectively adopted the Ninth Circuit approach as
espoused in United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978);
see supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text, by adhering to State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1981), in which the Tennessee court applied the Adams rule. Clearly, then, the
federal circuits are shifting away from the rule of per se admissibility, albeit not in Iockstep
fashion.
